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Abstract
Subjective Bayesianism is a major school of uncertain reasoning and statistical
inference. Yet, it is often criticized for an apparent lack of objectivity. By and large,
these criticisms come in three different forms. First, the lack of constraints on prior
probabilities, second, the entanglement of statistical evidence and degree of belief,
third, the apparent blindness to bias in experimental design. This paper argues
that the above criticisms pertain to some specific senses of scientific objectivity. On
a more comprehensive understanding of that concept, the criticisms fail to hold
water; in fact, subjective Bayesianism may even be more objective than some of its
competitors.
1 Introduction
Subjective Bayesianism is a major school of uncertain reasoning and statistical infer-
ence that is steadfastly gaining popularity. It is based on the subjective interpreta-
tion of probability and describes how prior degree of belief in a scientific hypothesis
is updated to posterior degree of belief. This creates a straightforward connection
between the mathematical theory of probability and the epistemological question of
which hypothesis is confirmed by the evidence. What makes subjective Bayesianism
subjective is the honest representation of personal degree of belief in terms of prob-
abilities, rather than the pursuit of uniquely rational degrees of belief (Bernardo and
Smith, 1994; Howson and Urbach, 2006).
Subjective Bayesianism should be distinguished from an “anything goes” position
where degrees of belief are only constrained by probabilistic coherence: the rational
degree of belief to make a certain observation, given a certain parameter value (e.g.,
the chance of observing both heads and tails in two i.i.d. tosses of a fair coin) may
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be uniquely determined. Similarly, we may have theoretical reasons to believe that
not all probability distributions over the value of an unknown parameter are equally
adequate. Subjective Bayesians may agree in their probabilistic judgments surprisingly
often, but it is characteristic of their view that there is no principled way of resolving
disagreement.
Being objective is essential for any method of scientific inference, including sub-
jective Bayesianism: objectivity contributes to the reliability of research, conveys an
image of epistemic authority and strengthens our trust in science. The 2009 “Cli-
mategate” affair and the recent “replication crisis” in psychology (i.e., the widespread
failure to replicate experimental results due to various forms of bias, see Makel et al.,
2012), illustrate how an apparent lack of objectivity weakens trust in scientific findings.
Subjective Bayesian inference is often criticized for an apparent lack of objectivity: “a
notion of probability as personalistic degree of belief [...], by its very nature, is not
focused on the extraction and presentation of evidence of a public and objective kind”
(Cox and Mayo, 2010, 298). This view is echoed in writings of well-known statisticians
and philosophers of science such as Fisher (1956), Mayo (1996), Popper (2002) and
Senn (2011).
The objectivity-related criticisms of subjective Bayesian inference come, by and
large, in three different forms. First, the lack of constraints on prior probabilities,
second, the entanglement of statistical evidence and degree of belief, third, the appar-
ent blindness to bias in experimental design. In the light of these objections, one is
tempted to conclude that Bayesian inference cannot produce objective knowledge, is
not suitable for scientific communication and is therefore inferior to frequentist infer-
ence.
This paper addresses the above objections (Section 2–4). The defense concedes
that Bayesian inference is—like any method of inference—not fully objective in every
possible sense, but that it promotes various important senses of objectivity. More-
over, claims that it is less objective than other inferential frameworks can be rebutted.
The final section concludes and embeds our discussion into a broader debate about
objectivity in science (Section 5).
2 Objection 1: The Choice of the Prior Distribution
Bayesian inference is based on prior probability distributions. Assume that you are
interested in assessing a hypothesis H0 ∈ H. You represent your prior belief in H0 by
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means of a probability distribution over the entire space of hypothesesH. Assume fur-
ther that for any H ∈ H, your data D follow a definite probability distribution p(D|H).
Then, your posterior degree of belief in the null hypothesis H0 can be calculated by
the formula
p(H0|D) = p(H0)p(D|H0)p(D) (1)
where p(D) = ∑H∈H p(D|H)p(H) is the marginal probability of data D. On the
basis of the posterior probability p(H0|D), a Bayesian can form a theoretical judgment
about H0 or make a practical decision. For example, if H0 is the hypothesis that a new
medical drug is not more efficacious than a placebo, and if H0 is sufficiently probable
given the data, then we will not pursue further development of the drug.
The posterior probability depends on the prior probability, and often, there is not
sufficient background knowledge to establish consensus on prior probabilities. Sub-
jective Bayesians such as Ramsey (1926) and de Finetti (1972) have stressed that in
principle, any coherent prior probability distribution can be defended as rational. This
attitude seems to jeopardize any claims to objectivity that subjective Bayesians could
possibly make. What kind of epistemic warrant does a Bayesian inference still provide?
After all, the choice of the prior can hide all kind of pernicious values, e.g., financial
interests of the experiment sponsor. This is particularly worrying in sensitive areas
such as medicine, where the need for impartial inference methods is particularly high,
due to the manifest financial interests in clinical trials and the ethical consequences of
wrong decisions. As the medical methodologist Lemuel Moyé writes:
Without specific safeguards, use of Bayesian procedures will set the stage
for the entry of non-fact-based information that, unable to make it through
the “evidence-based” front door, will sneak in through the back door of
“prior distributions”. There, it will wield its influence, perhaps wreaking
havoc on the research’s interpretation. (Moyé, 2008, 476)
The objection claims that Bayesians can bias the final result in their preferred direction
by choosing an appropriate prior. This objection is thus based on the value-free ideal
that the core business of scientific reasoning, namely evaluating evidence, assessing
and accepting theories, should be free of non-cognitive values and individual biases—
a requirement that Bayesian inference seems to violate blatantly. Adherence to the
value-free ideal has, however, in one form or another, been upheld as a trademark of
scientific objectivity (e.g., Weber, 1904; Lacey, 1999; Reiss and Sprenger, 2014), and for
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practitioners, it plays an even greater role due to regulatory constraints and conflicts of
interests. Even if one doubts that the value-free ideal can be attained in practice—e.g.,
because any inference involves an implicit tradeoff of false negatives and false positives
(Rudner, 1953)—, values should not be allowed to replace scientific evidence (Douglas,
2008, 2009). How can Bayesian inference be safeguarded against this danger?
The first defense notes that subjective opinion need not be the same as individual
bias. Two medical doctors may, on the basis of their experience, give a different judg-
ment about what might be a good therapy for a patient with a given set of symptoms.
The fact that they disagree does not mean that one of them or both are biased: they
may have enjoyed a different training, come from different disciplines or have different
experience in dealing with those symptoms. Prior probability distributions provide a
way to make explicit a judgment that is fed by individual expertise and track record.
This is also a reason why many models of expert judgment and decision-making use
subjective Bayesian inference—even when “objective risk assessments” or the like are
required (Cooke, 1991).
The second defense notes that prior probabilities are open to rational criticism.
Whenever a prior distribution is used, be its shape conventional or peculiar, the re-
searcher should justify her particular choice and explain which considerations (theo-
retical and empirical ones) led her to this choice. We cannot justify an extreme pos-
terior simply by choosing a suitably extreme prior because it is part of the Bayesian
model of reasoning that also the prior needs to be justified. This is also explicit in
regulations for medical trials, such as the guidelines for the use of Bayesian statistics,
issued by the Food and Drug Administration of the United States:
We recommend you be prepared to clinically and statistically justify your
choices of prior information. In addition, we recommend that you per-
form sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of your models to different
choices of prior distributions. (US Food and Drug Administration, 2010)
The above quote hints to a second requirement in Bayesian reasoning: to perform a
sensitivity analysis on the choice of the prior and to check whether the main result of
the research remains intact under different prior assumptions. Such an analysis also
contributes to scientific objectivity in terms of “convergent objectivity” (Douglas, 2004,
2009, 2011), according to which a scientific result can claim to be objective when it is
validated from different assumptions and perspectives. Checking how a variation in
the prior affects variation in the results therefore contributes to drawing conclusions
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which satisfy this sense of objectivity.
Finally, the third defense notes that the explicit choice of a prior distribution ex-
poses modeling assumptions more clearly than competing paradigms. In frequentist
inference, for example, such assumptions are more implicit and harder to identify.
This makes it easier for the Bayesian to criticize a particular choice, contributing to sci-
entific objectivity in the sense of a reasoning process that is transparently conducted
and open to rational criticism (Longino, 1990). We will get back to this point in the
final section.
The bottom line is that the choice of the prior is just like any other modeling as-
sumption in science open to rational criticism. Indeed, if the prior were not varied and
judged critically, there would be no corrective mechanism for gauging to what extent
personal bias has influenced the results through the choice of the prior. But the same
is true of scientific inference in general: if assumptions are not examined critically,
biased results are the necessary consequence. Screwing up a subjective Bayesian anal-
ysis with a biased prior is as easy or difficult as screwing up a non-Bayesian analysis
with biased modeling assumptions. Therefore, this objection is not more fearsome for
Bayesians than for any other framework of inductive inference. We now move to the
next objection: that Bayesians mix up belief and evidence.
3 Objection 2: Belief vs. Evidence
The second objection contends that scientific reasoning, and statistical analysis in par-
ticular, is not about assessing the subjective probability of hypotheses, but about find-
ing out whether a certain effect is real or due to chance. The task of science is to
state the objective evidence for the truth of the hypothesis. In this view, the Bayesian
statistician commits a category mistake: she tries to answer a question that scientists
are not (and should not be) interested in. Statistical reasoning is about the truth of
hypotheses and should be independent of subjective plausibility judgments. Ronald
A. Fisher, one of the fathers of modern statistics, forcefully articulated this view:
Advocates of inverse probabilities [ascribing probabilities to scientific hy-
potheses given some data, J.S.] are forced to regard mathematical probabil-
ity, not as an objective quantity measured by observable frequencies, but
as measuring merely psychological tendencies, theorems respecting which
are useless for scientific purposes (Fisher, 1935, 6–7)
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Royall (1997, 4) makes a similar distinction between three major questions in statis-
tical analysis: “What should we believe?”, “What should we do?” and “What is the
evidence?”. A good answer to one of them need not be a good answer to another
question. The Bayesian answers the belief questions by providing prior and posterior
probabilities, but what does a satisfactory response to the evidence question look like?
Underlying this objection is the idea of “detached objectivity” (Douglas, 2009, 459):
claims to scientific knowledge should be detached from personal belief and wishful
thinking. Bayesians also struggle to achieve “concordant objectivity” (Douglas, 2004,
462–463), that is, intersubjectively agreed assessments of evidence. As Quine (1992,
5) stated it: “The requirement of intersubjectivity is what makes science objective.”
However, the “psychological tendencies” that correspond to personal degrees of belief
do not fulfil this requirement.
Many philosophers and scientists share the view that subjective Bayesian infer-
ence falls short of achieving concordant objectivity. Williamson (2007) notes that “full
objectivity—i.e. a single probability function that fits available evidence” cannot be
achieved in the subjective Bayesian framework. Bem et al. (2011, 718) quote a Psycho-
logical Science referee as saying
I have great sympathy for the Bayesian position [. . . ] The problem in imple-
menting Bayesian statistics for scientific publications, however, is that such
analyses are inherently subjective, by definition [. . . ] with no objectively
right answer as to what priors are appropriate. I do not see that as useful
scientifically. It is unclear to me how we can have agreed upon priors for a
collective such as the body of psychological researchers.
In other words, even if the priors are not contaminated by extra-scientific values (see
Section 2), they still mirror individual perspectives. It is not clear how objective ev-
idence can be extracted from them, without tying each interpretation to a particular
(subjective) model.
To address this point, we study the most popular Bayesian measures of evidential
support in some detail. The Bayes factor (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Lee and Wagenmak-
ers, 2013) expresses the support for H0 over the alternative H1 in terms of the ratio of
posterior and prior odds. Equivalently, the Bayes factor can be expressed as the ratio
of (integrated) likelihood of H0 and H1:
B01(D) :=
p(H0|D)
p(H1|D) ·
p(H1)
p(H0)
=
∫
θ∈Θ0 p(D|θ)p(θ)dθ∫
θ∈Θ1 p(D|θ)p(θ)dθ
(2)
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It is important to note that the Bayes factor is not affected by p(H0) and p(H1) sim-
pliciter. For two point hypotheses H0 and H1, it is even fully independent of the prior
probability distribution: it is just the likelihood ratio p(D|H0)/p(D|H1), indicating
how much D favors H0 over H1. Nothing depends on personal belief.
For composite hypothesis (e.g., H1 : θ ∈ [a, b], θ 6= θ0), things are more complicated.
The value of the Bayes factor depends on how likely the observed evidence is under
the various components of H0 and H1, weighted with their relative prior probability.
It is important to realize that this dependency is benign and not pernicious in the
context of null hypothesis testing. Imagine the frequent case that we are testing the
null hypothesis that a certain intervention, e.g., taking vitamin C tablets as a cure for
the common flu, has no effect at all: H0 : θ = 0 and H1 : θ 6= 0, where θ is the variable
denoting the effect size. Of course, it is implausible that the effect of the vitamin C
intervention is exactly zero: the tablets will cause a biochemical reaction in the human
body even if it is negligibly small. The test aims at finding out whether we can use the
null hypothesis as a simple and precise, but strictly speaking wrong idealization of a
complex reality (Gallistel, 2009). In order to assess whether a finding is evidence for
or against H0, we need to know which effect sizes are plausible and clinically relevant.
Only if this is clarified, we can state meaningfully that the observed results speak in
favor of or against the null hypothesis.
Frequentist inference proceeds similarly. When deciding on the sample size N of an
experiment, the choice of N reveals the power of an experiment for relevant alternative
hypotheses (=effect sizes). An experiment that would have low power for plausible
effect sizes would be misdesigned and futile. Therefore, the relative plausibility of the
alternative hypotheses affects the level of evidential support. The view that degrees of
belief must not play any role in assessing evidential support is taking the value-free
ideal and the idea of detached objectivity one step too far. Indeed, also Douglas (2004,
460) stresses that objectivity in scientific reasoning should not imply the elimination of
personal perspective; this would actually be a gross misrepresentation of how science
works. Values must not play a detrimental role in inference, but this is arguably not
the case in Bayesian hypothesis testing.
Regarding intersubjectivity/concordant objectivity, we have seen that the raw ob-
servations often underdetermine levels of evidence, and in such a situation, the goal
of intersubjective agreement may be elusive. The Bayesian is able to differentiate such
a situation from those where the evidence is agreed upon, but inconclusive.
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I conclude this section with an example of how considerations pertaining to sci-
entific objectivity may lead one to a quasi-Bayesian position on measuring evidential
support. Birnbaum’s Likelihood Principle (all experimental evidence about an un-
known parameter θ is contained in the likelihood function L(θ) = p(D|θ) for observed
data D) is one of the cornerstones of Bayesian inference. I do not want to contribute to
the debate about the Likelihood Principle, but just notice that it can be derived from
the following two principles (Birnbaum, 1962):
Sufficiency Principle If T(X) is a sufficient statistic for a parameter θ, that is,
P(X = x|T(X) = t, θ) = P(X = x|T(X) = t) (3)
and we observe T(x1) = T(x2) in two separate experiments, then both experi-
ment generate the same evidence about θ.
Conditionality Principle If a chancy trial (e.g., the toss of a coin) decides which of
two experiments E1 and E2 about parameter θ shall be performed, then only the
outcome of the actually performed experiment is evidentially relevant.
Both principles can be read as restricting the inferential role of information that does
not directly serve an epistemic goal: the Sufficiency Principle claims that evidential
support only depends on observations of a particular kind, and the Conditionality
Principle marks certain procedural aspects of an experiment (e.g., which alternative ex-
periments could have performed) as evidentially irrelevant. We thus see that Bayesian
and quasi-Bayesian concepts of evidence can even be foundationally justified from re-
quirements that express the need for a certain type of objectivity in inference. This is
remarkable, given the large history of objections to Bayesian inference that are based
on an apparent lack of objectivity, as exemplified in the quotes by Fisher, Cox and
Mayo.
4 Objection 3: Experimental Design and Error Control
The third objection to subjective Bayesianism concerns the problem of bias in trials
with interim looks at the data. The problem can best be motivated with an example
from medicine. Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are currently the gold standard
within evidence-based medicine. They are usually conducted as sequential trials allow-
ing for monitoring for early signs of effectiveness or harm. In sequential trials, data
8
are typically monitored as they accumulate. That is, we have interim looks at the data
and we may decide to stop the trial before the planned sample size is reached. By
terminating a trial when overwhelming evidence for the effectiveness or harmfulness
of a new drug is available, the prohibitive costs of a medical trial can be limited and
in-trial patients are protected against receiving inferior treatment.
However, such truncated trials are often seen as problematic. In a review of 134
trials stopped early for benefit, Montori et al. (2005) point to an inverse correlation
between sample size and treatment effect: the smaller the sample size achieved by the
trial at the moment of stopping, the larger the estimate it provided for the effect. These
findings are supported by a more recent study by Bassler et al. (2010) where truncated
trials report significantly higher effects than trials that were not stopped early. While
the authors of these studies do not object to monitoring and truncating trials in general,
they advocate that results (e.g., effect size estimates) from such trials be treated with
caution. Truncating a trial seems to introduce a bias toward overestimating effect sizes.
A good measure of evidential support should take this into account.
Bayesian measures of evidence such as the Bayes factor do not depend on the sam-
pling protocol or experimental design and evaluate truncated trials like fixed-sample
trials. Indeed, critics of Bayesian inference such as Deborah Mayo (1996) complain that
decoupling statistical inference from the sampling protocol “can lead to a high proba-
bility of error, and [...] this high error probability is not reflected in the interpretation
of data” (Mayo and Kruse, 2001). In the context of medical research, the Bayesian
seems to provide carte blanche for implementing any design that favors the pursuit of
certain non-cognitive values, such as the financial interests of the trial sponsor. For
instance, we could sample on until a significant result is reached and then decide not
to report that the results were reached in a biased way. After all, the sampling protocol
is evidentially irrelevant for the Bayesian. Again, the perceived threat to the objectiv-
ity of Bayesian inference comes from the hidden intrusion of bias and non-cognitive
values into statistical reasoning.
Three responses can be made to this criticism. First, the phenomenon on which the
criticism is based can also be described differently. Higher effect sizes in truncated tri-
als are not surprising, but predictable (Goodman et al., 2010). Of all treatments, highly
efficacious ones will be most prone to early termination for benefit. That is, when
the actual effect size is large, it is more probable that we also observe a large effect in
our sample and decide to terminate the trial. Hence, the observed difference between
truncated and completed trials is precisely what we should expect. Comparing trun-
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cated to completed trials amounts, as highlighted by Berry et al. (2010), to selecting
the trials to be compared on the basis of their outcome. In that light, it is questionable
whether the observed effect size difference is really problematic.
Second, prior knowledge or empirically-based prior expectations are highly rel-
evant for dealing with overestimated effects. Imagine that we are interested in the
relative risk reduction which a medical drug provides. A Bayesian represents her un-
certainty by means of a prior probability distribution over that quantity. By means
of Bayes’ Theorem, this distribution is updated to a posterior probability distribution
that synthesizes the observed evidence with the background knowledge. Then, the
Bayesian framework naturally accounts for the intuition that truncated trials should
be treated with caution: for the same observed effect size, small sample sizes change
the prior distribution less than large sample sizes. The posterior distribution visual-
izes these differences in an intuitive way that can be directly used for decision-making
(Goodman, 2007; Nardini and Sprenger, 2013). In other words, the subjective Bayesian
has an automatic safeguard against rash conclusions which other inference schools do
not possess.
Third, that Bayes factors do not depend on the sampling protocol does not imply
that Bayesians should ignore matters of experimental design. Procedural objectivity
in the form of following certain regulatory constraints and standard procedures can
be helpful to eliminate certain forms of institutional bias (Douglas, 2004, 2009). In
fact, guidelines for the use of Bayesian statistics (such as the ones issued by the Food
and Drug Administration) stress that Bayesians should be as conscious and diligent
in matters of experimental design as frequentists. For instance, also from a Bayesian
perspective, a test with high type I and type II errors is evidently a bad test. The
point of disagreement is different: while the frequentist bases her post-experimental
evaluation of the evidence on the pre-experimental design and the properties of the
entire experiment, the Bayesian considers these properties as essential for obtaining
valid data, but as orthogonal to the question of how to interpret them once they are
in.
In total, the claim that Bayesian inference in sequential trials contains an implicit
bias can be soundly rebutted. The particular problem of sequential analysis and mon-
itoring ongoing trials poses no challenges to Bayesian inference that it does not also
pose to competing paradigms.
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5 Conclusion: A Digression on Scientific Objectivity
The concept of scientific objectivity is a notoriously difficult one, with various aspects
and interpretations. It is a commonly shared view, though, that objective conclusions
support the epistemic authority of science, distinguishing it from religion or political
ideology. No wonder that statistical approaches are also valued according to their abil-
ity to provide an image of objectivity. Objective reasoning can manifest itself in differ-
ent ways, e.g., leading to intersubjective agreement on evidence, priority of evidence
over values, freedom of idiosyncratic bias, standardization of inference procedures,
responsiveness to criticism, and so on. The standard criticisms of Bayesian inference
relate to selected aspects of the complex notion of scientific objectivity. We recap the
main ideas below.
First, there is the idea that subjective Bayesian inference is particularly vulnerable
to the intrusion of bias and non-cognitive values since there is apparently no restriction
on choosing prior probabilities. However, prior degrees of belief can incorporate valu-
able expertise and background information and they can (and should!) be criticized
like any statistical model assumption. Once these points are recognized, the objection
loses its bite. It can also be demonstrated that sensitivity analysis in Bayesian infer-
ence contributes to convergent objectivity in Douglas’s sense: validation of a result
from different independent perspectives (Section 2).
Second, there is the fear that on a Bayesian approach, scientific evidence is al-
ways entangled with (possibly idiosyncratic and biased) subjective judgments of be-
lief. Similarly, one may argue that intersubjective agreement on levels of evidence—
the concordant dimension of objectivity—is hard to achieve on a Bayesian approach.
We have shown that for simple hypothesis testing, these fears are not substantiated.
And for composite hypotheses, the Bayes factor (=the Bayesian’s standard measure
of evidence) only depends on the relative weight of the individual hypotheses—a de-
pendency which we have argued to be benign and necessary for meaningful scientific
inference.
Finally, I would like to gloss on aspects of objectivity that relate to interaction and
mutual criticism in a research community. Here, Helen Longino (1990) has forcefully
argued that scientific objectivity is not only about scientific reasoning itself, but also
about the structure of scientific discourse: the possibility of openly criticizing each
other’s assumptions, providing a floor for the exchange of rational arguments, etc. In
this respect, Bayesian inference has several important assets: it is honest and trans-
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parent about the assumptions it makes and clearly distinguishes between prior belief,
evidence, and conclusions (=posterior belief). This points out clear avenues for model
criticism and allows for a straightforward detection of inappropriate bias, such as prior
assumptions that heavily favor a particular hypothesis. Such bias is usually more hid-
den in frequentist inference, e.g., in experimental designs that deliver impressively low
p-values and barely discernible, scientifically irrelevant effect sizes at the same time.
Moreover, subjective Bayesianism provides a rigorous description of what happens
when the prior assumptions on a parameter value are varied. The transparency of the
role of individual degrees of beliefs, hidden and implicit in other schools of statistical
inference, can be seen as a plus of subjective Bayesianism from the vantage point of
scientific objectivity.
In the light of these arguments, claims that subjective Bayesians cannot quantify
evidence in an objective way must be rejected as unjustified. They rely on a too nar-
row and one-sided view of scientific objectivity, on a too simplified picture of Bayesian
inference and on a blind eye regarding the shortcomings of classical, frequentist in-
ference. Even more, it has been shown that the diversity of prior distributions that
characterizes subjective Bayesianism can also be a strength from the point of view of
scientific objectivity.
Finally, a caveat. The purpose of this article is not to promote subjective Bayesian-
ism as a one-size-fits-all solution for problems of statistical and scientific inference.
It is well known that in many modeling problems, it is difficult to come up with
meaningful subjective degrees of belief. Rather, I have argued that when an inference
problem is such that subjective Bayesianism can be used to solve it, the apparent lack
of objectivity should not prevent us from applying Bayesian methods. The objectivity
problem is no more and less pressing than for any other scientific method.
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